Fall-Out: New York v. United States and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Problem by Dreilinger, Samantha
Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 7
Spring 2010
Fall-Out: New York v. United States and the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Problem
Samantha Dreilinger
This Note or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Samantha Dreilinger, Fall-Out: New York v. United States and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Problem, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol'y. 183
(2010).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol5/iss1/7
Copyright 2010 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 5 (Spring 2010) 
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 
 
Fall-Out: New York v. United States and the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Problem 
Samantha Dreilinger∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 For over thirty years, the United States has failed to solve its low-level radioactive 
waste problem.1  Working independently, state governments have not developed a single 
new disposal site for low-level radioactive waste.2  Congress’ best efforts to address the 
growing quantities of waste included passing a law that, in part, required states to accept 
responsibility for all low-level radioactive waste.3  Unsurprisingly, most states opposed 
this provision and were relieved when the Supreme Court deemed it unconstitutional in 
New York v. United States.4  As the states and the federal government remain at an 
impasse, low-level radioactive waste accumulates in countless makeshift storage facilities 
across the country.5 
¶2 The road to New York began in 1985 when Congress passed the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (Amendments Act).6  The Amendments Act 
put forward a series of incentives and penalties that Congress believed would persuade 
states to develop disposal sites.7  The most severe and controversial penalty was the 
“take-title” provision, under which a state that failed to develop or secure access to a 
                                                 
∗ Juris Doctor Candidate, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law.  I would like to thank the editors 
of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their invaluable assistance in preparing this 
Article for publication.  I would also like to thank David Dreilinger for his love, support, and insightful 
comments on each draft. 
1 Although low-level radioactive waste is only one of many types of radioactive waste produced in the 
United States, it constitutes eighty-five percent of the volume and creates a majority of the disposal 
problems.  See Jane Chuang, Who Should Win the Garbage Wars? Lessons from the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2403, 2433, 2456 (2004) (discussing the emergence of the low-
level radioactive crisis in the 1970s; the legislation, passed in 1980, that tried to address it; and later stating 
that no new low-level radioactive waste disposal sites have been developed). 
2 Id. at 2455. 
3 “Accepting responsibility,” otherwise known as “taking-title,” forces states to take possession of the low-
level radioactive waste and accept legal liability in the case of any of accident, leakage, or storage problem.  
See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; High Court Eases States’ Obligation Over Toxic Waste, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1992, at 1.  
4 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
5 These private storage facilities lack the oversight and safety precautions of an official disposal site.  
William F. Newberry, The Rise and Fall and Rise and Fall of American Public Policy on Disposal of Low-
Level Radioactive Waste, 3 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 43 (1993).  For example, 191 generators of LLRW in New 
York stored 319,803 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste in undisclosed locations in 2008.  See 
N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEV. AGENCY, N.Y. STATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STATUS 
REPORT FOR 2008, at 17, 18 (2009) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STATUS 
REPORT], available at http://www.nyserda.org/Energy_Information/llrw%202008-rev.pdf.  
6 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (Amendments Act) of 1985, 42 U.S.C.                 
§ 2021(b)–(j) (2006).  
7 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2436. 
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disposal site by January 1, 1996, would be forced to accept legal ownership and liability 
for all of its low-level radioactive waste.8 
¶3 In the early 1990s, it was clear that the states and the federal government were 
heading toward a confrontation.  The Amendment Act’s deadline was rapidly 
approaching, yet community opposition and legal challenges had prevented states from 
beginning the lengthy process required to develop disposal sites.9  Faced with accepting 
legal responsibility for thousands of feet of privately-generated low-level radioactive 
waste, one state challenged the constitutionality of the Amendments Act: New York.10 
¶4 New York’s challenge culminated in New York v. United States.11  In New York, the 
Supreme Court struck down the take-title provision of the Amendments Act.12  
According to Justice O’Connor, the take-title provision was inconsistent with the 
Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state governments because it 
would “‘commandeer’ state governments into the service of federal regulatory 
purposes.”13 
¶5 New York is widely considered to be one of the Rehnquist Court’s most important 
decisions, as well as one of Justice O’Connor’s most influential opinions.14  The New 
York decision is also credited with setting the limits on the affirmative powers granted by 
Commerce Clause,15 reinvigorating the Tenth Amendment,16 and signaling the 
resurgence of dual federalism.17  New York is a seminal decision, cited in cases dealing 
with issues as far-reaching as products liability,18 assisted suicide,19 gun control,20 and 
gambling on Native American Reservations.21  Unfortunately, the New York decision did 
not solve the United States’ low-level radioactive waste problem.  Not a single state has 
                                                 
8 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).  
9 Richard C. Kearney, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Environmental Policy, Federalism, and 
New York, 23 PUBLIUS 57, 62 (1993). 
10 Id. at 66. 
11 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
12 Id. at 188. 
13 Id. at 175. 
14 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability 
Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastucture, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 39 (2010) (discussing how the New York 
decision made “legal history”); Mark Latham, The Rehnquist Court and the Pollution Control Cases: Anti-
Environmental and Pro-Business?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 144 (2007) (discussing how New York was 
one important case, among others, that signaled the reemergence of federalism as a powerful constitutional 
doctrine in the Court). 
15 See John C. Yoo & Jennifer L. Koester, Judicial Safeguards of Federalism and the Environment: Yucca 
Mountain from a Constitutional Perspective, 75. U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1323–27 (2004) (underlying the 
New York opinion was an understanding that the Framers explicitly rejected a system in which the 
government would regulate the states directly). 
16 See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 565 (2007) (explaining that New York was one of the 
first “New Federalism Tenth Amendment” cases defining the Tenth Amendment as a simple rule against 
the federal commandeering of state apparatuses). 
17 Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1328–29 (2004). 
18 Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 631, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
19 Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). 
20 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 396–97 (2d Cir. 2008). 
21 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 61 n.10 (1996). 
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developed a new low-level radioactive waste disposal site,22 leading some to view the 
opinion as “‘good federalism but bad public policy.’”23 
¶6 In fact, in the almost twenty years since the New York decision, the United States’ 
low-level radioactive waste problem has become increasingly dire.  Between 1999 and 
2003, the production of low-level radioactive waste increased by 200%.24  Yet, disposal 
capabilities remained static.  Without progress in the past two decades and with no 
solution on the horizon, the United States’ low-level radioactive waste problem has been 
silently, but steadily, coming to a head.25 
¶7 This Comment will reintroduce the problem of low-level radioactive waste and 
emphasize the pressing need for a comprehensive solution.  It will trace the history of 
low-level radioactive waste in the United States and the problems that led to the 
Amendments Act.  This Comment will then discuss the New York decision and its impact 
on the current low-level radioactive waste disposal process.  It will show that without an 
immediate, workable solution, the low-level radioactive waste problem will become 
progressively worse.  The Comment concludes by offering a solution to the United 
States’ low-level radioactive waste problem through a federal-state power sharing 
arrangement derived, ironically, from New York, the very case that exacerbated the 
dimensions of low-level radioactive waste disposal.  
II. WHAT IS LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE? 
¶8 Radioactive waste is generated from a variety of sources: the U.S. military’s 
nuclear weapons program, commercial nuclear power plants, medical applications, and 
corporate and university-based research programs.26  Low-level radioactive waste 
represents eighty-five percent of all radioactive waste produced in the United States.27  
Low-level radioactive waste is created when materials come into contact with radioactive 
material or are exposed to neutron radiation.28  This waste typically includes items used 
at research facilities, such as the clothing worn by researchers, protective shoe covers, 
rags, mops, and filters.29  Tools and materials contaminated in the course of research, 
such as luminous dials, medical tubes, swabs, injection needles, syringes, laboratory 
                                                 
22 Kearney, supra note 9, at 62. 
23 Id. at 57 (quoting unknown commentators). 
24 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-604, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: DISPOSAL 
AVAILABILITY ADEQUATE IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO IDENTIFY ANY FUTURE 
SHORTFALLS 13 (June 2004) [hereinafter 2004 GAO REPORT: LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04604.pdf.  
25 The issue is rarely discussed in policymaking circles or the mainstream press.  However, there are a few 
exceptions.  Every three to four years the Government Accountability Office provides a brief update on 
some aspect of low-level radioactive waste.  See, e.g., id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-
221, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT: APPROACHES USED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES MAY 
PROVIDE USEFUL LESSONS FOR MANAGING U.S. RADIOACTIVE WASTE (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07221.pdf. 
26 Richard C. Kearney & John J. Stucker, Interstate Compacts and the Management of Low-Level 
Radioactive Wastes, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 210, 214 (1985). 
27 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432. 
28 See id. 
29  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Low-Level Waste, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/low-level-
waste.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2009). 
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animal carcasses, sample tissues, and water used in nuclear reactors, also often become 
low-level radioactive waste.30   
¶9 The type of material and concentration of radioactivity dictates the risks associated 
with each container of low-level radioactive waste.31  Some low-level radioactive waste, 
such as the remnants of medical research, poses no significant hazard to humans unless 
inhaled or consumed.32  However, other low-level radioactive waste, like water used in 
nuclear reactors, may be extremely hazardous.  Exposure to this type of waste could lead 
to an increased risk of cancer or even death.33  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) classifies low-level radioactive waste based on its potential hazards.34  Although 
the classification of waste is complex, Class A waste generally contains lower 
concentrations of radioactive material than Class B or Class C waste.35   
¶10 Low-level radioactive waste is shipped to a disposal site by the generator in an 
NRC approved container.36  The waste, usually still in the shipping container, is then 
disposed of through a “shallow burial system” comprised of specially-engineered 
trenches laying under several feet of soil.37  The container remains in these trenches until 
it deteriorates to safe levels of radioactivity, usually twenty to thirty years.38  In 2006, the 
United States disposed of approximately four million cubic feet of radioactive waste.39 
¶11 Currently, there are only three operational low-level radioactive waste disposal 
sites in the United States.  The first site, in Barnwell, South Carolina, opened in 1971.40  
Barnwell is licensed to accept Classes A, B, and C radioactive waste.41  Between the 
1970s and 2008, Barnwell accepted low-level radioactive waste from all generators.  In 
2008, Barnwell restricted access to those generators in Connecticut, New Jersey, and 
South Carolina, members of the Atlantic Compact.42  
¶12 The second facility, located in Richland, Washington, opened in 1965.43  The 
Richland site is licensed to accept Class A, B, and C low-level radioactive waste.44  Like 
the Atlantic Compact, in 1985 the Richland site limited access to generators in Alaska, 
                                                 
30 Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214. 
31 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, RADIOACTIVE WASTE: PRODUCTION, STORAGE, DISPOSAL 24 (2002)  




34 Id. at 20. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 25.   
37 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2433. 
38 Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214. 
39 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Low-Level Waste Disposal Statistics, 
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/statistics.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2009). 
40 Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A 
Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047, 1081 (1994). 
41 S.C. Energy Office Website, Radioactive Waste Disposal Program, 
http://www.energy.sc.gov/index.aspx?m=8, (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
42 Id.  The Atlantic Compact is one of several interstate compacts formed around low-level radioactive 
waste disposal.  See generally U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Low-Level Waste Disposal, 
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/locations.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (discussing the 
unique elements of each of the interstate compacts). 
43 Gerrard, supra note 40, at 1081. 
44 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal Facilities, 
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/locations.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010). 
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Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington,Wyoming, Colorado, Nevada, and 
New Mexico, members of the Northwest and Rocky Mountain Interstate Compacts.45  
¶13 The third low-level radioactive waste disposal site is located in Clive, Utah.  The 
Clive site is only licensed to accept Class A waste, the least radioactive type of low-level 
radioactive waste.46  Unlike the Barnwell or Richland sites, which are operated in 
partnership with the state governments of South Carolina and Washington, the Clive site 
is privately owned and operated.  The Clive site is also the only low-level radioactive 
waste disposal facility that has not restricted access to members of specific interstate 
compacts.47    
¶14  Although the Clive site did not start accepting low-level radioactive waste until 
1988, it should not be considered a “new” site.48  Prior to receiving a license to dispose of 
low-level radioactive waste, the Clive site was a “Hazardous Industrial Zone.”49  With 
two hazardous waste incinerators and a hazardous waste landfill already on the premises, 
the company did not have to go through the lengthy siting process or negotiations with 
the state or local communities to develop an additional low-level radioactive waste 
disposal site.50   
III. EARLY REGULATION, 1950–1980 
¶15 Radioactive waste did not accumulate in substantial quantities until after World 
War II, when nuclear scientists applied the technology developed for the atomic bomb to 
civilian uses such as nuclear power, industrial research, and medical innovation.51  At 
first there was no government regulation of low-level radioactive waste; generators 
simply dumped it into the ocean.52  In the 1950s, the National Academy of Sciences and 
the Atomic Energy Commission published a study that investigated the environmental 
impact of ocean dumping.53  In response, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (AEA).54  The AEA provided the federal government the authority to fully regulate 
all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle from mining to processing to storage and, finally, to 
disposal of all by-products including low-level radioactive waste.55  Although the AEA 
                                                 
45 Washington State Department of Ecology Website, Nuclear Waste, Non-Hanford Work, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/nwp/llrw/llrw.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).  For information on the 
Rocky Mountain Compact, see generally U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Low-Level Waste 
Disposal, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). 
46 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2454. 
47 See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal Facilities, 
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/locations.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (discussing the 
three operating LLRW disposal sites, with only Clive identified as “accepting waste from all regions”). 
48 M.R. Ledoux & M.S. Cade, Licensing and Operation of the Clive, Utah Low-Level Radioactive 
Containerized Waste Disposal Facility—A Continuation of Excellence (paper presented at the Waste 
Management Conference, Feb. 22–24, 2002, Tucson, Ariz.) (on file with Merrill-Cazier Library, Utah State 
University), available at 
http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=govdocs. 
49 Id. at 2. 
50 Id.  
51 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432. 
52 Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214; Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432. 
53 Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214. 
54 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976)); see 
Kearney, supra note 9, at 59. 
55 Kearney, supra note 9, at 59. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  L A W  A N D  S O C I A L  PO L I C Y  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
188 
provided a uniform and efficient system, the states wanted input and some control over 
the location of low-level radioactive waste disposal sites.  Congress incorporated these 
concerns when the AEA was amended in 1959.56  
¶16 In 1960, pursuant to the AEA, the federal government granted licenses to private 
companies to develop disposal facilities.57  The companies could select the location of a 
disposal site, but were required to receive the approval of state and local government 
officials before building the facilities.58  State officials encouraged the development of 
disposal facilities in order to attract “high-tech” industriesthe future of the economy 
that they believed would require low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities.59  In 
1961, the first low-level radioactive waste disposal site opened in Beatty, Nevada.60  Over 
the next decade, similar arrangements led to five new disposal sites located in Kentucky, 
Washington, Illinois, New York, and South Carolina.61  At the time, these six disposal 
facilities were able to accommodate all of the United States’ low-level radioactive waste. 
¶17 Problems arose between 1975 and 1978 when the federal government shut down 
three of the disposal sites due to poor management.  Leaks at the New York and 
Kentucky sites created pools of radioactive ground water.62  The Illinois site was closed 
because the land area reached capacity, and the NRC refused to license space for 
additional burial.63  At the same time, highly publicized accidents at nuclear facilities, 
such as Three-Mile Island,64 created strong anti-nuclear sentiments that foreclosed any 
chance a community might allow a new low-level radioactive waste site to be 
developed.65  
¶18 By 1979 there were only three operational low-level radioactive waste disposal 
sites remaining.  Only one of these sites, Barnwell, South Carolina, was located near the 
east coast where the majority of low-level radioactive waste was generated.66  Low-level 
radioactive waste is very expensive to transport, and, as a result, Barnwell received eighty 
to ninety percent of the United States’ low-level radioactive waste.67  The situation 
reached a crisis point when, later that year, two of the remaining three sites, Richland, 
Washington and Beatty, Nevada, were temporarily shut down for improperly handling 
and packaging of low-level radioactive waste.68  During this time Barnwell was the only 
                                                 
56 Id.  
57 Newberry, supra note 5, at 45. 
58 Id. at 46. 
59 Id. 
60 Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214. 
61 Id.  
62 See Chuang, supra note 1, at 2433–34 n.304 (discussing how three low-level radioactive waste sites were 
closed by 1978 due to ground water pooling and radioactive leachate contamination; the locations of these 
sites, New York, Kentucky, and Illinois are identified in the footnote).  
63 Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 214. 
64 The Three Mile Island accident of 1979 was a partial core meltdown of the Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Generating Station in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.  It was the most significant accident in the history of 
the American commercial nuclear power generating industry, resulting in the release of an estimated 
43,000 curies of radioactive krypton.  See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website, Backgrounder on 
the Three Mile Island Accident, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2010).  
65 Newberry, supra note 5, at 46. 
66 Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 216. 
67 Id. at 214–15. 
68 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2434. 
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available low-level radioactive waste disposal site in the country.  Faced with an 
increasing amount of waste, South Carolina feared it would become the “nuclear 
dumping ground” for the rest of the country.69  The governor soon announced that the 
Barnwell site would halve the amount of waste it received over the next two years and 
increase its disposal fees for low-level radioactive waste by 600%.70  The governors of 
Nevada and Washington, afraid of being left with the waste previously sent to South 
Carolina, also threatened to increase prices and restrict access to disposal sites.71   
IV. THE ROAD TO NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES, 1980–1992 
A. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
¶19 With low-level radioactive waste accumulating around the country and the looming 
possibility that the United States would be left with no disposal sites, Congress decided to 
take action.72  Congress swiftly passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 
1980 (Policy Act).73  The Policy Act, based on a proposal authored by the disposal site 
states,74 had two basic provisions.  First, states were responsible for securing access to a 
disposal site.75  This could be accomplished either by independently developing a site, or 
by forming an interstate compact with other states.  Second, after January 1, 1986, the 
states with disposal sites would have the authority to restrict the use of their disposal sites 
to states within their compacts.76  
¶20 States immediately rushed to form interstate compacts.77  Although interstate 
compacts are not widely understood, they are a method of intergovernmental cooperation 
provided for in the Constitution,78 and they have been been utilized for over 200 years to 
regulate trade and commerce between the states.79  Interstate compacts appeared to be an 
elegant solution to the low-level radioactive waste problem.  For one, it was neither 
efficient nor practical for every state to develop a disposal site since, under a state 
compact, only one state in the compact would have to develop a low-level radioactive 
waste disposal site.  Moreover, these interstate compacts allowed the states to work 
together without interference from the federal government, giving them the autonomy 
they perpetually requested.   
¶21 Unfortunately, the Policy Act did not require any particular configuration for the 
compacts.  States were left to grope and barter with their neighbors over endless 
                                                 
69 Thomas O’Toole, A Dump Closing Threatens to Halt Cancer Research, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1979, at 
A1. 
70 Kearney, supra note 9, at 61. 
71 Gerrard, supra note 40, at 1081. 
72 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432. 
73 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (Policy Act) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573, § 2189, 94 Stat. 
3347 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021b–2021d (1995)). 
74 See Kearney, supra note 9, at 60–61 (discussing how in testimony before Congress, the governors of the 
three host site states recommended that the national LLRW policy encompass two basic principles, which 
were then included in the Policy Act). 
75 Policy Act § 4(a)(1). 
76 Policy Act § 4(a)(2)(B). 
77 Kearney, supra note 9, at 61. 
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No state shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power.”). 
79 Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 210. 
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permutations of the compact arrangements.80  By treating each state as an equal 
sovereign, the law posed a particular problem for states that generated little waste.81  
Discussing the plight of these states in later years, the Department of Energy noted: 
Regardless of whether a State generates large amounts of low-level waste, 
or virtually none at all, the State must commit substantial resources to 
finding ways to dispose of its waste within the time period set forth in the 
Act. States that generate very small amounts of low-level waste continue 
to face legal, financial and political challenges disproportional to their 
contribution to the national waste management burden. For example, six 
unaffiliated States (Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota and Vermont) and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, 
shipped a total of 16,080 cubic feet of low-level waste for disposal in 
1988. This represents about 1 percent of the total volume of waste shipped 
for disposal nationally.82 
Despite the inherent difficulties posed by the compacting process, states understood that 
securing access to a disposal site was crucial.  By 1984, thirty-six states had entered into 
eight compacts.83 
¶22 With the interstate compacts in place, states embarked on the second phase of the 
Policy Act: developing a disposal site.  Unfortunately, as the states soon realized, 
developing a low-level radioactive disposal site was going to be even more difficult than 
the compacting process.  By 1985, only three of the interstate compacts had access to an 
operating disposal site.  Not surprisingly, these were the compacts that formed around the 
original disposal sites in South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington.  With the Policy Act’s 
January 1st deadline less than six months away, thirty one states would soon have no 
assured outlet for their low-level radioactive waste.  The original disposal site states, still 
hosting the only three operating facilities in the United States, did not want to accept the 
waste from these states and renewed their threats to restrict access to the disposal sites.   
Congress and the states were at a standstill yet again. 
B.  Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
¶23 Congress, with the assistance of the National Governors Association (NGA), 
drafted a “transition package” to ensure access to the current sites while states completed 
the lengthy process required to develop new low-level radioactive waste disposal sites.84  
The result was the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985 
(Amendments Act).85  Similar to the Policy Act, under the Amendments Act each state 
                                                 
80 Newberry, supra note 5, at 48. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. (quoting the U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT ON LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
MANAGEMENT PROGRESS 37 (1989)). 
83 Kearney & Stucker, supra note 26, at 216. 
84 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2435. 
85 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (Amendments Act) of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 
99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021e (2006)). 
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was responsible for the disposal of its low-level radioactive waste.86  It also encouraged 
states to enter into interstate compacts to provide for the establishment and operation of 
low-level radioactive waste sites.87  The important difference between the two pieces of 
legislation was that Congress, reacting to criticism that the Policy Act was hasty and 
vague, included three provisions in the Amendments Act that established a variety of  
milestones, incentives, and penalties that made it increasingly costly to states that did not 
secure access to a low-level radioactive waste disposal site.88   
¶24 The first provision offered monetary incentives.  States with disposal sites could 
levy a surcharge for out-of-region waste which could be increased every few years.89  
One quarter of the surcharges collected were to be transferred to an escrow account held 
by the Secretary of Energy.90  The Secretary would then partially reimburse all states that 
complied with the following deadlines: by July 1, 1986, states were required to either join 
a compact or indicate that they planned to “go it alone”;91 by January 1, 1988, each state 
that joined a compact had to identify which state had been selected to host the low-level 
radioactive waste disposal site, announce where the site would be located, and develop a 
siting plan;92 by January 1, 1990, each new disposal compact or single-state disposal site 
was required to file an application for an operational license.93  States failing to meet the 
deadlines would not recover the money in the escrow account and could be assessed even 
greater surcharges for access to a disposal site.94  
¶25 The second provision allowed host states to deny access to low-level radioactive 
waste disposal sites if certain milestones were not met.  If a state missed either the July 
1986 deadline or the January 1988 deadline by one year, or the January 1990 deadline at 
all, the Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina disposal sites could refuse to accept that 
states’ low-level radioactive waste.95 
¶26 The third provision was the take-title provision at issue in New York v. United 
States.  If a state was unable to develop or secure access to a disposal site by January 1, 
1996, it would take-title to all low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders.96  
Taking-title meant that a state would take possession of all of the waste generated within 
its borders and become liable for all damages “directly or indirectly incurred by such 
generator or owner as a consequence of the failure to take possession.”97  The take-title 
provision was thus a steep penalty because it forced state governments to manage the 
storage and disposal of low-level radioactive waste without the expertise and equipment 
of the generators.  It also required states to accept legal liability for accidents, leaks, or 
                                                 
86 42 U.S.C. § 2021c (a)(1)(A) (2006). 
87 § 2021d (a)(2). 
88 Carol S. Weissert & Jeffery S. Hill, Low-level Radioactive Waste Compacts: Lessons Learned from  
Theory and Practice, PUBLIUS, Fall 2004, at 27, 35. 
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1) (providing that a disposal site state could charge as follows: in 1986 and 
1987, ten dollars per cubic foot; in 1988 and 1989, twenty dollars per cubic foot; in 1990, 1991, and 1992, 
forty dollars per cubic foot of low-level radioactive waste). 
90 § 2021e(d)(2)(A). 
91 § 2021e(e)(1)(A). 
92 § 2021e(e)(1)(B)(i–ii). 
93 § 2021e(e)(2)(C). 
94 § 2021e(e)(2)(A), (B), (D). 
95 § 2021e(e)(2)(A), (B), (D). 
96 § 2021e(d)(2)(C). 
97 § 2021e(d)(2)(C). 
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any other of the host of harms that can accompany the transportation, storage, or disposal 
of low-level radioactive waste.   
¶27 Congress hoped that this mix of incentives, milestones, and deadlines would 
encourage states to develop low-level radioactive waste disposal sites.  Unfortunately, 
even with concrete deadlines and attractive incentives, states could not comply with the 
Amendments Act.   
¶28 Compacts adopted a hybrid “public participation”98 and “incentive”99 model for 
siting waste disposal facilities that required input from the affected communities at all 
stages of the site’s development and tried to facilitate acceptance through incentives.100  
Unsurprisingly, communities across the country were not amenable to the proposition of 
a radioactive waste disposal site in their neighborhoods.  This phenomenon is known as 
“not-in-my-back-yard” (NIMBY).  NIMBY is not limited to environmental or “no-nuke” 
activists.101  Rather, NIMBY activists are people who oppose disposal sites for diverse, 
but ostensibly deeply felt, reasons.102  NIMBY sentiments are pervasive for all locally 
unwanted land-use decisions, including: airports, prisons, solid waste incinerators, and 
landfills.103  However, NIMBY sentiments are “particularly vitriolic toward hazardous 
and radioactive waste.”104  Responses to a word-association survey of attitudes toward a 
nuclear waste repository, for example, revealed “pervasive qualities of dread, revulsion, 
and anger.”105 
¶29 States invested enormous amounts of time, effort, and money to pacify the strong 
NIMBY sentiments that quickly materialized at the mere mention of nuclear waste.  New 
York, for example, offered prospective host communities a bundle of incentives worth an 
estimated two million dollars.106  New York also promised to preserve open spaces and 
create local jobs.107  Yet not one community was willing to let the state develop a low-
level radioactive waste disposal site. 
¶30 The concerns of NIMBY activists illustrate the difficulty of convincing a 
community to accept a process that is inherently inequitable.108  Developing a low-level 
radioactive waste disposal site creates a burden on one community for the benefit of 
another.109  As a result, regardless of the type of waste, communities oppose disposal 
sites.  For example, plans to develop new municipal waste landfills spur, almost 
immediately, numerous legal challenges.110  States dealing with low-level radioactive 
                                                 
98 See Gerrard, supra note 40, at 1158 (describing the public participation model and explaining that the 
most common forms of participation are public hearings, citizen advisory boards, and membership on siting 
boards). 
99 See, e.g., Jay Romano, Radioactive Waste? Nimby, Towns Tell State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at NJ1 
(explaining that New York promised communities to preserve open spaces and create local jobs in return 
for the ability to develop a LLRW disposal site). 
100 See Chuang, supra note 1, at 2458 (describing the modern siting process as a mix of public participation 
and compensation schemes). 
101 Kearney, supra note 9, at 63. 
102 Id. at 63–64.   
103 Id. at 63. 
104 Id. 
105 Newberry, supra note 5, at 44. 
106 Romano, supra note 99, at NJ1. 
107 Id.   
108 Gerrard, supra note 40, at 1122–25. 
109 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2440. 
110 Id. at 2415–23 (discussing the many court cases that resulted from municipal waste siting). 
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waste, therefore, not only encounter the traditional opposition to waste sites, but also 
must overcome the stigma and fear that attaches to anything related to nuclear power or 
radioactive waste.    
¶31 Unable to placate the NIMBY activists, and afraid that any announcement of a 
potential low-level radioactive waste disposal site would bring negative state-wide 
attention, state officials hoped that they could meet their obligations under the 
Amendments Act by incentivizing or bullying another compact member to host the 
disposal site.  Relations in these compacts tended to be cooperative until one state was 
selected by the others to host the low-level radioactive waste disposal site.111  At that 
point the state either dropped out,112 was expelled,113 or instituted litigation to enjoin the 
compact’s decision.114 
¶32 An example of inter-compact discord is Nebraska’s litigation against the Central 
Midwest Compact (Midwest Compact).  After it was selected to host a disposal site, 
Nebraska quickly commenced multiple lawsuits.115  In Nebraska v. Central Interstate 
Low-level Radioactive Waste Commission, Nebraska claimed that the Midwest Compact 
did not have the authority to enforce a deadline for developing a disposal site.116  
Specifically, it disagreed with the decision of the Midwest Compact’s governing 
committee to file an action to enforce the siting deadline.117  The Eighth Circuit found for 
the Midwest Compact, but acknowledged that the only relief available was allowing the 
Midwest Compact to file an additional action to enforce Nebraska’s obligations or 
revoking its membership.118  The court pointed out that revoking a state's membership 
would be pointless because it did nothing to further the development of a disposal site,119 
and would thus be “akin to curing the disease by killing the patient.”120    
¶33 Nebraska requested that the Supreme Court review the Eighth Circuit’s decision.121  
However, before the Supreme Court could grant or deny certiorari, Nebraska and the 
Central Interstate Compact Commission reached a court-approved settlement.122  
Nebraska agreed to withdraw its Supreme Court appeal and the Compact Commission 
agreed to file a “Satisfaction of Judgment” upon Nebraska’s timely payment of a $140.5 
                                                 
111 Kevin M. Johnson, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Upholding the Integrity of Interstate Compacts, 8 MO. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 18, 18–19 (2001).  
112 See Chuang, supra note 1, at 2454 (discussing how North Carolina withdrew from the Southeast 
Compact after it was unable to develop a disposal facility). 
113 Kearney, supra note 9, at 62; see AUDEEN W. FENTIMAN ET AL., OHIO STATE UNIV., RER-62, 
FACTSHEET: HISTORY OF THE MIDWEST INTERSTATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACT, 
http://ohioline.osu.edu/rer-fact/rer_62.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (discussing how Michigan was 
expelled from the Midwest Compact after it was selected as a host state and “failed to live up to its 
obligations”).  
114 Johnson, supra note 111, at 23. 
115 Id.  
116 187 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 1999). 
117 Id. at 988. 
118 See id. at 986 (discussing how the Midwest Compact can either commence an action to enforce 
Nebraska’s obligations or revoke its membership). 
119 Johnson, supra note 111, at 25. 
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million dollar settlement.123  Nebraska then terminated its membership in the Compact 
and closed its low-level radioactive waste program.124    
¶34 By the early 1990s it was clear that compacts not affiliated with an original 
disposal site were not going to meet the deadlines imposed by the Amendments Act. 
States working together in compacts could still not overcome NIMBY protests.  NIMBY 
protests made states reluctant to host sites, and, as the Nebraska court pointed out, inter-
compact litigation cured the “disease” for the designated host state, but “killed the 
patient.”  Years were wasted, thousands of dollars were spent, and many states were still 
no closer to developing low-level waste disposal sites.125   
¶35 New York, a state that generated a relatively large share of the United States’ low-
level radioactive waste,126 was not going to meet the 1996 deadline.127  After declining to 
join a compact, New York decided that it would comply with the Amendments Act by 
siting and financing a disposal facility within the state.128  Like many states, New York 
formed a Low-level Radioactive Waste Siting Commission (N.Y. Commission) to 
oversee the siting process.129  Each of the N.Y. Commission’s decisions were met by 
vociferous objections.130  For example, when Williamsburg, New York was identified as 
an interim storage site, hundreds of angry residents protested outside city hall and the 
proposed storage site for days.131  Opposition grew when New York announced five 
potential locations for a permanent low-level radioactive waste disposal site.132  State 
officials soon realized that strong NIMBY sentiments would prevent New York from 
meeting the 1996 deadline.  New York was stuck: theoretically, it should support the 
solution drafted by Congress and the NGA, yet state officials did not want to accept 
responsibility and liability for all of its low-level radioactive waste.  In the end, state 
officials, concerned about the negative publicity that would result from developing a site 
and the ramifications of the take-title provision, decided to challenge the Amendments 
Act in court.133     
                                                 
123 Id.  
124 Id. (“As a result of this agreement, the agency plans to close out its Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Program Activities.  The Department has not requested additional general funds to operate the program.  In 
addition to activities related to program closeout, current Low-Level Radioactive Waste program staff have 
assumed other duties in the agency.  One staff member will have a continuing role monitoring national low-
level radioactive waste activities.”). 
125 See Johnson, supra note 111, at 19. 
126 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992); see also U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Website, Low-Level Waste Compacts, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/compacts.html 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (stating that New York generates seventy percent of U.S. LLRW). 
127 See Kearney, supra note 9, at 66 (describing the many difficulties encountered by New York when it 
attempted to site a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility, and how this, plus wide spread “citizen 
resistance,” led the state and two counties to file the law suit). 
128 New York, 505 U.S. at 154. 
129 Gary Pierre, Neighborhood Report: Williamsburg; Breathing Easier After the Last Shipment of 
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V. NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES 
¶36 In New York v. United States, New York alleged that the Amendments Act violated 
the Constitution’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause.134  Connecticut, New Jersey, and fifteen other 
states filed or joined briefs on New York's behalf.135  The states of Washington, Nevada, 
and South Carolina joined the federal government as defendants.136  The District Court 
for the Northern District of New York dismissed New York’s complaint.137  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.138  On appeal, New 
York limited its complaint to allege only violations of the Tenth Amendment and the 
Guarantee Clause.139   The Supreme Court granted certiorari.140  In a six-to-three 
decision, the Court held that the take-title provision of the Amendments Act violated the 
Tenth Amendment.141 
¶37 The Court, in an opinion written by the steadfast states’ rights advocate Justice 
O’Connor, began its analysis of the Amendments Act with the monetary-incentive 
provision.142  States with disposal sites could impose a surcharge on low-level radioactive 
waste received from other states.  Further, the Secretary of Energy could collect a portion 
of this surcharge and place it in an escrow account.143  A percentage of these funds would 
be dispersed to states that achieved a series of milestones outlined in the Amendments 
Act.144  According to the Court, moving waste from state to state was interstate 
commerce and Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to force states to 
charge a fee for accepting low-level radioactive waste from other states.145  Similarly, 
relinquishing a portion of the surcharge to the Secretary of Energy was found to be 
permissible as a federal tax on interstate commerce.146  Returning some of this money to 
states that achieved milestones was found to be a valid exercise of the Spending Clause: 
Congress may place conditions, such as attaining certain milestones, upon the receipt of 
federal funds.147  According to the Court, the monetary-incentive provision was 
comparable to other permissible congressional actions, such as making a portion of 
federal highway funding contingent on a state raising the legal drinking age from 
eighteen to twenty-one.148 
                                                 
134 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992).  
135 Greenhouse, supra note 3, at 1. 
136 New York, 505 U.S. at 154. 
137 New York v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 10, 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). 
138 New York v. United States, 924 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1991). 
139 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992).  The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
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¶38 The Court also upheld the Amendments Act’s denial-of-access provision.149  In this 
provision, Congress authorized states and regional compacts with disposal sites to 
gradually increase the fees for accepting low-level radioactive waste, eventually refusing 
to accept all out-of-state or out-of-compact waste from states that did not meet federal 
guidelines.150  Similar to the monetary-incentives provision, the Court found support for 
this provision in the Commerce Clause.151  Although New York claimed that this 
provision was merely a mechanism to force states to regulate low-level radioactive waste 
according to the federal program, the Court maintained that the provision provided states 
a choice.152  States could either regulate the disposal of radioactive waste according to 
federal guidelines, or the state’s generators of low-level radioactive waste would be 
prohibited from exporting the waste.153  This was an acceptable exercise of the 
Commerce Clause because, unlike the impermissible take-title provision discussed 
below, the burden of non-compliance fell on those who generated the waste, not on the 
state as a sovereign.154  Under this provision, a state that did not want to comply with the 
Amendments Act would not be forced to spend any money or participate in a federal 
program.155   
¶39 While the previous two provisions of the Amendments Act were found to 
encourage states to provide low-level radioactive waste disposal sites, the Court held that 
the take-title provision violated the Tenth Amendment because it “crossed the line 
distinguishing encouragement from coercion.”156  The take-title provision provided that 
any state that did not develop a disposal site or join an interstate compact that had access 
to a site by January 1, 1996 became liable for all damages caused by the inability to 
export low-level radioactive waste.157  Put simply, a state could either adhere to the 
milestones of the Amendments Act or accept ownership of all its low-level radioactive 
waste.   
¶40 The Court found that the take-title provision provided two unconstitutional options 
that would “commandeer[] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”158  First, Congress could not 
simply transfer the waste from the generators to the state government because “forced 
transfer, standing alone, would in principle be no different than a congressionally 
compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers.”159  Second, 
Congress could not assign liability to the state for waste produced by non-governmental 
entities, which the Court noted “would be indistinguishable from an Act of Congress 
directing the States to regulate in a way that accepted the liabilities of certain state 
residents.”160  Thus, because both the instruction to state governments to take title and the 
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151 Id. at 174. 
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direct order to regulate were beyond the authority of Congress, “it follows that Congress 
lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the two.”161 
¶41 This ruling, however, was not the end of the Amendments Act.  According to the 
Court, the take-title provision was severable from the rest of the legislation, meaning it 
could be removed and the overall intent of the Amendments Act would still be intact.162  
As a result, the first two provisions of the Amendments Act continued, and continue, to 
guide states struggling with low-level radioactive waste.  Pursuant to the Policy Act and 
the Amendments Act, a state has three options: (1) it can join an interstate compact that 
has access to an existing site, (2) it can join an interstate compact and, with the other 
states, try to develop a site, or (3) it can work independently to develop a site.  States with 
disposal sites are allowed to levy surcharges and restrict or deny access to out-of-compact 
states.163  However, without the take-title provision, if a state fails to develop a disposal 
mechanism, there is no penalty.164  Without penalties, state officials have no motivation 
to risk the ire of NIMBY activists or enforce contentious interstate-compact decisions.  
New York may have reinvigorated the Tenth Amendment and represented “good 
federalism,”165 but without a single new disposal site, it is now clear that it led to bad 
public policy.  
VI. LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE TODAY: NEW YORK’S FALL-OUT 
¶42 The New York decision put the states in a predicament they have yet to resolve.  
States are required to find a solution to their low-level radioactive waste problem, but 
lack the tools necessary to overcome strong NIMBY protests or enforce interstate 
compact decisions.  As a result, more and more states are turning to the most convenient 
solution available: forcing generators that are unable to pay for access to disposal sites to 
hold their waste in unofficial, makeshift storage facilities. 
¶43 New York’s experience illustrates this dilemma.  State officials’ first response to 
New York was to attempt to negotiate a regional compact with neighboring states.166  
When this failed, they tried to join an existing compact.167  This effort was no more 
successful: other states were deterred by New York’s large volume of low-level 
radioactive waste and the negative iniquities that would result from joining a compact 
with a bigger and notoriously aggressive state.168  With no possibility of access to a 
disposal site outside of the state, and NIMBY sentiments preventing the development of a 
disposal site within its borders, state officials were stuck, again.169  New York decided 
                                                 
161 Id. at 176. 
162 Id. at 186. 
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165 Id. at 57. 
166 Id. at 65 
167 Id. 
168 Id.  
169 It was NIMBY and the inability to build a site that led to New York v. United States.  See id. at 66 
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that its only solution was to pass the responsibility of dealing with low-level radioactive 
waste to the generators.170   
¶44 Currently, generators in New York have only two disposal options: they can ship 
their waste to an official disposal site at considerable expense, or they can store their 
waste onsite.171  Neither option is sustainable.  After the Barnwell, South Carolina site 
restricted access to members of its compact in 2008, the only site that will accept waste 
from New York is in Clive, Utah.  Transporting low-level radioactive waste is very 
expensive and New York generators that choose this option must pay to ship their waste 
over 2250 miles.172  All generators that cannot or will not pay for official disposal must 
store the waste on their premises or pay for interim storage.  These makeshift storage 
facilities lack the proper oversight and safety features of an official site.173   As a result, 
in 2008 alone, 191 generators of low-level radioactive waste in New York stored 
approximately 319,803 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste in undisclosed 
locations.174 
VII. THE FUTURE OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
¶45 The most obvious solution to the problem of low-level radioactive waste disposal, 
eliminating or modifying the processes and procedures that create such waste, is 
unrealistic.  Low-level radioactive waste is an inevitable by-product of essential medical 
and scientific research,175 and continues to be produced in greater quantities.176  Further, 
climate change concerns may lead to more nuclear power plants, which are considered 
relatively clean energy sources but which also generate low-level radioactive waste. 177   
¶46 As the quantity of low-level radioactive waste increases, the probability that it will 
be disposed of safely at an official site decreases.  The few operating disposal sites 
consistently capitalize on the waste-disposal monopoly; over the last decade disposal fees 
have increased from $40 per cubic foot to over $300 per cubic foot.178  As a result, states 
                                                 
170 See id. at 69 (stating that after the New York decision the State of New York considered temporary 
storage facilities, but most states were expecting to force generators to store the waste indefinitely).  New 
York also passed the The New York State Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act, which requires 
low-level radioactive waste generators in the state to submit annual reports to NYSERDA providing 
detailed information on waste generated, stored, and disposed.  See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1854-d (1995). 
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N.Y. STATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STATUS REPORT, supra note 5 (discussing the amounts of 
low-level radioactive waste generated in New York that was stored or disposed of in 2008).  
172 Author’s calculation based on distance from New York City to Clive, Utah via highway. 
173 See Kearney, supra note 9, at 70 (explaining that unofficial storage sites could be damaged by natural 
disasters). 
174 See N.Y. STATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STATUS REPORT, supra note 5, at 17, 18. 
175 See Chuang, supra note 1, at 2432, 2434 (explaining that civilian low-level radioactive waste is mostly 
created through nuclear power, industrial research, and medical applications, and that lack of access to low-
level radioactive waste disposal sites “prompted scares that valuable medical research would be stopped in 
its tracks”). 
176 According to data provided by the three commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal facility 
operators, disposal volumes grew to about twelve million cubic feet in 2003, an increase of 200% over 
1999.  2004 GAO REPORT: LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE , supra note 24, at 4.  
177 See, e.g., Larry Rohter, 2 Endorsements of Nuclear Power, but Sharp Differences on Details, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at A25 (noting that increased nuclear power was endorsed by both presidential 
candidates). 
178 Chuang, supra note 1, at 2455. 
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have no choice but to allow generators to store, rather than dispose of, low-level 
radioactive waste.  This leads to low-level radioactive waste in warehouses, closets, and 
storerooms in research laboratories and nondescript buildings across the country.179  
These unofficial storage facilities lack the safety precautions and expertise of an official 
disposal site, greatly increasing the probability of accidents or contamination.180   
¶47 The United States can address the low-level radioactive waste problem in three 
ways: (1) maintain the status quo with states controlling waste disposal, (2) return control 
to the federal government, or (3) establish a federal-state power-sharing arrangement 
within the confines of New York.  
A. Status Quo 
¶48 There is no need to revisit at length the arguments against maintaining the current 
low-level radioactive waste disposal system.  States have failed to build a single new 
disposal site since the 1970s.  The production of low-level radioactive waste each year 
exceeds the United States’ disposal capabilities.  There is an alarming trend of storing 
low-level radioactive waste in makeshift storage facilities.   
¶49 Proponents of maintaining the status quo could suggest that, although slow, recent 
progress toward a new low-level radioactive waste disposal site in Texas supports the 
current system.  In early 2009, Valhi Inc. announced that the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) approved its license for a new disposal site in Andrews 
County, Texas.181  Valhi noted that the Texas hospital system supported the Andrews 
County disposal site, which would be open to generators in Texas and Vermont, 182 
because it would ensure that the “diagnosis, treatment and research of cancer and other 
life threatening diseases, which generate such wastes, can continue.”183  According to the 
company: 
This is an important milestone for . . . the people of Andrews and Lea 
Counties and the states of Texas and Vermont. . . . In addition to providing 
more than 75 new jobs at our Andrews County facility, this license will 
ensure that Texas and Vermont hospitals, universities, power plants and 
other enterprises will be able to continue operating with the knowledge 
that there is an assured solution for the permanent disposal of their [low-
level radioactive waste].184   
¶50 However, what the Valhi press release failed to mention is that this was not the first 
time TCEQ approved the development of a new low-level radioactive waste disposal site 
in Texas.185  On at least two occasions, companies were forced to abandon potential 
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disposal sites when their announcement sparked community opposition and litigation.186  
In fact, since 1980, the State of Texas and private investors have spent more than $1 
billion in unsuccessful attempts to license, develop, and operate low-level radioactive 
waste disposal sites.187   
¶51 Unsurprisingly, the plan to develop the Andrews County site also faces opposition.  
Andrews County residents are divided on the issue, and community organizations are 
already planning to protest.188  The Sierra Club, an environmental non-profit, is 
investigating a legal appeal to TCEQ’s decision.189  In short, there is nothing to indicate 
that Valhi will be any more successful than its predecessors.190   
B. Federal Solution 
¶52 The second option is to allow the federal government to control all aspects of low-
level radioactive waste disposal.  Federal responsibility for low-level radioactive waste is 
not a new proposition.  In the 1950s, the Atomic Energy Act gave the federal government 
the sole power to regulate all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle, including the disposal of 
low-level radioactive waste.191   
¶53 The federal solution would also fit within the confines of the New York decision.  
Justice O’Connor’s opinion did not forbid the federal government from regulating low-
level radioactive waste.  In fact, Justice O’Connor affirmed that the Commerce Clause 
gives Congress this power.192  Justice O’Connor struck down the take-title provision 
because it would “commandeer” the state governments for a federal purpose. 193  Placing 
responsibility solely with the federal government, however, would not make state 
officials accountable for the decisions of the federal government.  
¶54 The problem with the federal solution is that states would immediately oppose any 
proposal that allowed for exclusive federal control of the siting and operation of a low-
level radioactive waste diposal facility.  Lobbying by state governments was a major 
factor in the federal government’s decision to abandon the AEA, under which it 
controlled low-level radioactive waste disposal, for the Amendments Act, which provided 
for a federal-state power-sharing arrangement.  State officials are understandably 
reluctant to let the federal government dictate the location of low-level radioactive waste 
disposal sites.  State officials may also fear that relinquishing control over low-level 
                                                                                                                                                 
Level Nuclear Waste Disposal (Oct. 23, 1998), http://www.agiweb.org/legis105/lownuke.html. 
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radioactive waste disposal sites will set a precedent for other contested siting processes, 
like landfills.194  Thus, although constitutional, state opposition would likely prevent 
Congress from passing a law that gives the federal government complete control over the 
low-level radioactive waste disposal process.  
C. Federal-State Power-Sharing Arrangement  
¶55 The third, and most promising, option is to continue the tradition of cooperation 
between the states and federal government.  Working together, states and the federal 
government built low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities in the 1960s.195  Congress 
and the states also supported the power-sharing arrangements in the Policy Act and the 
Amendments Act.196   
¶56 Many believe that New York left the burden and responsibility of low-level 
radioactive waste disposal solely with the states and private generators.197  However, the 
New York opinion only struck down one provision in the Amendments Act.198  Justice 
O’Connor was clear: the federal incentives, penalties, or other provisions in any low-level 
radioactive waste legislation are unconstitutional only if the penalties are coercive.199 
¶57 In fact, the New York decision referenced one power-sharing arrangement that has 
quite a bit of potential for addressing the current federal-state stalemate.  According to 
Justice O’Connor, the federal government can place conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds.200  The case Justice O’Connor used as precedent was South Dakota v. Dole.201  In 
Dole, South Dakota challenged a federal law that directed Elizabeth Dole, then-Secretary 
of Transportation, to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds from states “‘in 
which the purchase or public possession . . . of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is 
less than twenty-one years of age is lawful.’”202  The Court upheld the law under the 
Spending Clause’s broad grant of power to Congress.203  Furthermore, the Court noted 
that “[w]e have also held that a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional 
regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately 
placed on federal grants.”204  Thus, under Dole, the federal government could regulate 
low-level radioactive waste by making federal funds contingent on a state developing a 
disposal site.205   
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¶58 To encourage states to develop low-level radioactive waste disposal sites, Congress 
could mirror the provisions of the Amendments Act that the New York opinion already 
deemed to be legitimate regulations under the Commerce Clause and the Spending 
Clause.  For example, Congress could offer incentives to states with disposal sites by 
allowing disposal facilities to continue to restrict access and increase fees for out-of-
compact waste.206  States with disposal sites could also continue to restrict access to those 
states within its interstate compact.207  As low-level waste disposal became more 
expensive and difficult to secure, states without disposal sites would have an incentive to 
develop sites within the state or the various interstate compacts.  Finally, instead of the 
take-title provision, Congress could offer additional federal grants, as discussed in Dole, 
that were contingent on states developing low-level radioactive waste disposal sites.208   
¶59 A potential argument against relying on Dole is the Court’s warning that, in some 
circumstances, financial incentives offered by Congress might pass the point at which 
“pressure turns into compulsion.”209  In other words, the more money the federal 
government offers, the closer the incentive becomes to coerced regulation.210  The 
Court’s caveat was not problematic in Dole because a state that refused to raise the legal 
drinking age to twenty-one lost only a relatively small percentage of certain federal 
highway funds.211  On the other hand, states will likely require a significant financial 
incentive, well above five percent of federal highway funds, to develop low-level 
radioactive waste disposal sites.   
¶60 There are two important differences between the coercive regulation mentioned in 
Dole and the proposed low-level radioactive waste incentive packages.  First, states will 
have a meaningful choice whether or not to accept the financial package.  Unlike the law 
in Dole, which sought compliance from each individual state, the federal government 
needs only a handful of states to develop low-level radioactive waste disposal sites.  
Congress will have no incentive to pressure those states that strongly oppose developing 
a low-level radioactive waste disposal site, giving states what Justice O’Connor found to 
be the “critical alternative”—the ability to decline the federal program.212   
¶61 Second, one of the issues in Dole was that the law allowed the federal government 
to withhold federal highway funds from states that did not comply with the national 
drinking age.213  In contrast, states that agree to develop a low-level radioactive waste 
disposal site will be eligible to receive additional funds.  Thus, a state cannot claim that 
reliance on expected funds, already allocated to crucial programs in a forward-looking 
budgetary process, is coercing its participation in a federal program.214  Rather the state 
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would have the option to accept additional funding, and, as Justice O’Connor stated in 
New York, optional incentives are not coercive.215 
¶62 The decisions in Dole and New York offer a potential solution: the federal 
government may offer states monetary incentives to take part in federal programs, 
providing that the incentives do not coerce participation.  In addition, 2009’s unique 
financial and political atmosphere makes financial incentives a plausible solution.  The 
2008 economic crisis left states with deficits in the hundreds of millions, or even billions, 
of dollars.216  As state governments continually struggle to fill budgetary gaps, state 
officials are likely to be more amenable to federal programs that provide additional 
funding. 
¶63 Widespread financial difficulties also provide state and federal officials with an 
opportunity to develop a low-level radioactive waste disposal site with support, rather 
than opposition, from the community.  State officials are already making very unpopular 
decisions to increase tuition at public universities,217 limit municipal services,218 and raise 
taxes.219  In light of these options, NIMBY activists and community leaders may see a 
low-level radioactive waste disposal site as a better, if not ideal, solution.  With the  
highest unemployment rates in decades,220 communities may even welcome the 
additional jobs created by the construction and maintenance of a low-level radioactive 
waste disposal site.   
¶64 In previous years, the mere mention of a low-level radioactive waste disposal site 
would bring immediate, virulent protests.221  However, by offering new jobs and 
economic growth, government officials could finally discuss the fears associated with and 
misconceptions about disposal sites with a receptive, if tentative, audience.  For example, 
community activists are concerned that low-level radioactive waste disposal sites pose 
significant environmental and health risks.222  They view disposal sites as huge industrial 
facilities that spew toxins into air, water, and food.  In reality, low-level radioactive waste 
disposal sites bear a stronger resemblance to national parks than steel factories.  Low-
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level radioactive waste disposal happens underground.  Once a container is buried, it 
must be left undisturbed for thirty years.  As a result, a low-level radioactive waste 
disposal site requires acres of undeveloped land.223  Government officials could then 
explain that, although not without risk, developments in storage technology and modern 
environmental regulations have also removed many of the risks of leakage and 
groundwater contamination.  They could also emphasize that the current system, which 
allows for hundreds if not thousands of unofficial, undisclosed, makeshift storage 
facilities throughout the state, poses a much greater risk to communities.    
¶65 An effective education campaign combined with economic incentives has 
persuaded communities to accept other kinds of waste disposal sites.  Tullytown, 
Pennsylvania, for example, welcomed a new landfill after discussions with government 
officials resulted in an agreement to infuse the old mining town’s budget with $48 million 
over fifteen years.224  Arrangements like the deal negotiated in Tullytown benefit the 
states by allowing them to develop disposal facilities in areas with low land costs near 
sources of waste.  The arrangements also benefit the communities by providing 
compensation for accepting the risks associated with hosting a disposal site.225  
¶66 It is possible that generous incentive packages and well-presented educational 
campaigns will fail to overcome communities’ reservations about hosting a low-level 
radioactive waste disposal site.  However, 2008’s economic crisis makes this solution 
more plausible than in the past.  At worst, implementing a federal-state power-sharing 
arrangement will be an improvement on the status quo because it will prevent low-level 
radioactive waste from accumulating in multiple, undisclosed locations across the 
country, and it will reintroduce the problem of low-level radioactive waste disposal to 
policymakers.  At best, this proposal will lead to mutually beneficial arrangements that 
result in the development of desperately needed low-level radioactive waste disposal 
sites, as well as the long-awaited resolution of the United States’ low-level radioactive 
waste problem.   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶67 The United States cannot continue to ignore its low-level radioactive waste 
problem.  The amount of low-level radioactive waste currently exceeds the country’s 
disposal capabilities, and valuable scientific research and the quest for clean energy will 
likely result in the production of even more waste.  Working independently, state 
governments have not developed a single new disposal site for low-level radioactive 
waste.  Congress’ attempts to address the problem culminated in the Amendments Act 
almost fifteen years ago.  All the while, low-level radioactive waste has continued to 
accumulate in thousands of undisclosed warehouses across the nation.226 
¶68 Despite the thirty year stalemate, there are potential solutions to the United States’ 
low-level radioactive waste problem.  The most promising proposal is a new federal-state 
power-sharing arrangement.  The economic crisis presents state and government officials 
with a unique opportunity to negotiate a mutually beneficial incentive package that 
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allows for the development of desperately needed disposal sites, while providing states 
and local communities with additional funds and new jobs.  Although this solution might 
not successfully overcome the traditionally strong community opposition to waste 
disposal sites, it does complete the first step: to reintroduce the low-level radioactive 
waste problem and highlight the pressing need for a solution. 
 
